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UNANIMITY ON THE REHNQUIST COURT

by
Thomas R. Hensley *
Scott P. Johnson **

I. INTRODUCTION

The unanimous decision making process is an intriguing phenomenon. However,
the process ofjustices with different backgrounds, attitudes, and perceptions uniting
on a decision raises many difficult questions for judicial scholars.' Despite these
challenges, the limited amount of knowledge in the area of unanimous decision
making is troubling because such decisions constitute a sizable portion of judicial
decisions. For example, nearly one-half of the Court's decisions were unanimous2
during the 1996-1997 term.3 Given the Court's penchant for unanimity, it is
obvious that research into this area can contribute substantially toward explaining
the behavior of the Justices on the Court. Thus, the central question of this article
is: What characterizes the unanimous decision making process of the United States
Supreme Court? By examining all formally decided cases from the first five terms
of the Rehnquist Court (1986-1990), this study aims to provide new insights
regarding the determinants of unanimity.4
* Professor of Political Science, Kent State University. B.A., 1965, Simpson College;
M. A., 1967; Ph. D., 1970, University of Iowa.
** Visiting Assistant Professor of Political Science, SUNY at Fredonia. B.A., 1987,
Youngstown State University; M.A., 1990, University of Akron; Ph. D., 1998, Kent State
University.
1 For a good summary of the inherent difficulties in the study of unanimity, see Sheldon

Goldman, JudicialAppointments to the United States Courts of Appeals, 1967 Wis. L. REV.
186 [hereinafter Goldman, JudicialAppointments].
2 In this study, a unanimous decision is defined as any case outcome which is decided
by a 9-0, 8-0, 7-0, 6-0, or 5-0 vote.
' See generally UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REPORTS: LAWYERS' EDITION (1996-

1997).
' Data were collected on all formally decided cases for this five year period. This
involved a total of 677 cases. A significant portion of the data were gathered from the
Harold J. Spaeth data base. HAROLD J. SPAETH, UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT JUDICIAL
DATABASE, 1953-1993 TERMS (1995) (ICPSR study number 9422). The data relating to
case importance was taken from a separate source: THOMAS R. HENSLEY ET. AL., THE
CHANGING CONSTITUTION: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES 864 (1997).

These

authors used THE NEW YORK TIMES & UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REPORTS:
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II. IMPORTANCE OF THE PROBLEM

Why is it important to study unanimous decision making? As noted above,
unanimity is a relatively frequent occurrence on the Court. The fact that unanimous
decisions constitute a significant portion of the Court's output provides the
justification for exploring the determinants of unanimity. Table One illustrates how
frequently unanimous decisions occurred during the first five terms of the Rehnquist
Court from 1986 through 1990.'
TABLE 1: UNANIMOUS AND NON-UNANIMOUS DECISIONS ON THE
WARREN, BURGER, AND REHNQUIST COURTS (1953-1990 terms)
COURT (YEARS)
Warren (53-69)
Burger (70-85)
Rehnquist (86-90)
TOTALS

UNANIMOUS
7% (709)
36% (830)
38% (259)
37% (1789)

NONUNANIMOUS
63% (1200)
64% (1467)
62% (418)
63% (3085)

TOTAL
100% (1909)
100% (2297)
100% (677)
100% (4883)

During this time period, thirty-eight percent of all Court decisions were
unanimous. It is also important to recognize that the Court's propensity for
unanimity is not limited to the Rehnquist Court era. As illustrated by Table 1, the
Warren Court (1953-1969) and the Burger Court (1970-1986) displayed levels of
unanimity almost identical to the Rehnquist Court.6 Hence, unanimous decisions
have comprised over one-third of the Court's output during the last forty years.
When the frequency of unanimous decisions is coupled with the lack of information
currently existing on the subject, it seems imperative for judicial scholars to address
this type of decision making. Without scholarly attention to this problem, the legal
community is deprived of a key element in order to understand the judicial decision
making process. 7

LAWYERS' EDMON in measuring case importance. Id.
5
6

Spaeth, supra note 4. These data also were gathered from the Spaeth database.
Id.

' See generally Daniel R. Pinello, A Compendium and Analysis of Empirical Research
on the Relationship Between Judges' Political- Party Affiliation and Judicial Ideology in
American Courts (1997) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association). Pinello argues that a complete and meaningful picture of judicial
activity must include unanimous decisions. Id.
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M.

LITERATURE REVIEW

During the last half century, scholars have debated the factors responsible for
unanimity
Initially, scholars ignored unanimous decisions in their analysis of
judicial behavior by assuming that legal factors sufficiently explained unanimity.9
More recently scholars have utilized extra-legal ° factors related to attitudinal and
strategic behavior in an attempt to understand the complexities of unanimity.
A. The Law and Unanimity
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the law was considered by scholars as
the sole explanation for judicial behavior. 2 However, it was during this time that

8 See C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL POLITICS

AND VALUES, 1937-1947 xi-xvi (1948); see also Joel B. Grossman, Note, Social
BackgroundsandJudicialDecisions:Notesfor a Theory, 29 J. POL. 334 (1967) [hereinafter
Grossman, SocialBackgrounds];Sheldon Goldman, Backgrounds,Attitudes, and the Voting
Behavior of Judges: A Comment on Joel Grossman's"Social Backgrounds and Judicial
Decisions," 31 J. POL. 214 (1969) [hereinafter Goldman, Backgrounds,Attitudes]; Joel B.
Grossman, FurtherThoughts on Consensusand Conversion:A Reply to ProfessorGoldman,
31 J. POL. 223 (1969) [hereinafter Grossman, FurtherThoughts].
9 PRITCHETT, supra note 8, at xi-xii.
10 For a discussion of the distinction between extra-legal and legal factors in judicial
decision making, see Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein, On the Nature of Supreme Court
Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323 (1992). George and Epstein found that both
extra-legal and legal factors were significant in determining judicial behavior in capital
punishment cases. Id. at 333.
" For examples of studies using the attitudinal model to explain unanimity, see Saul
Brenner & Theodore S. Arrington, Unanimous Decision Making on the U. S. Supreme
Court: Case Stimuli and JudicialAttitudes, 9 POL. BEHAV. 75 (1987); see also JEFFREY A.
SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATrrrUDINAL MODEL 65

(1993).
For studies dealing with rational choice and strategic behavior, see Melinda Gann Hall
and Paul Brace, Order in the Courts:A Neo-InstitutionalApproach to JudicialConsensus,
42 W. POL. Q. 391 (1989); LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 1021(1998).
12 See JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 1-10 (1904). The legal model holds
the basic assumption that legal doctrines, developed from past cases, explained case
outcomes. EDWARD LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1 (1948). Basically,

judges are limited in their decision-making capacity by precedent and the concept of stare
decisis. Id. at 7. Proponents of the legal model have also focused upon other legal factors
such as the plain meaning of the Constitution, id., original intent of the Framers, id. at 7, or
congressional intent as determinants of judicial behavior. Id. at 28.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998
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4
legal scholars such as Oliver Wendell Holmes, 3 Roscoe Pound, and Louis D.
15
Brandeis began to question formal legal rules as the basis for judicial decision
making. In the 1920s and 1930s, the American legal realists contributed to this
debate by recognizing that judges interpret and manipulate legal rules and case facts
in deciding cases. 16 In the late 1940s, C. Herman Pritchett's work also intrigued
scholars by focusing attention on attitudes as a determinant of non-unanimous
decisions.' 7 However, even as scholars began their recognition of attitudes as a
critical part of judicial action, the law remained fundamental to the unanimous
decision making process.

In terms of understanding unanimity, Pritchett assumed that legal factors such
as the clarity of law, precedent, or the intent of congressional statutes were
responsible for unanimous decisions.' While non-unanimous decisions offered
policy choices for the justices, Pritchett speculated that the justices voted together
19
in cases where the law acted in a manner that offered no such choices. Pritchett' s
assumptions about the law and unanimity allowed behaviorally-oriented scholars
to ignore unanimous decision making. For many years, studies failed to address
20
whether the law, or other factors, actually influenced unanimity.
It was not until the debate between Joel B. Grossman and Sheldon Goldman in
the late 1960s that scholars began to explore seriously the factors responsible for
unanimity. 2' In the first part of this exchange, Grossman suggested that legal factors

'" See generallyOliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457 (1897)
(emphasizing the empirical study of law). Oliver Wendell Holmes served as ajustice on the
U. S. Supreme Court from 1902-1932.
'4 See ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 1-25 (1922)
(encouraging judges to use law in order to satisfy the needs of society). Roscoe Pound was
the founder of sociological jurisprudence and the dean of Harvard Law School.
'" See generally Louis D. Brandeis, The Living Law, 10 ILL. L. REV. 461 (1916)
(developing an innovative argument that social science was necessary in legal
argumentation). This became known as "the Brandeis brief." Muller v. Oregon, 208 U. S.
412 (1908). Brandeis served as a Justice on the U. S. Supreme Court from 1916-1939.

16

See WILFRED E. RUMBLE,

JR. AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM

1- 12 (1968). See also K. N.

Llewellyn, The Constitutionas an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1934).
'7 PRrrCHETr, supra note 8, at 25-31 (concluding that the political attitudes of the
Justices, as demonstrated from the votes, could be ranked in their support for policies
concerning such areas as criminal justice and economic activity).
18 Id.
19 Id.

2 See Pinello, supra note 7.
See Grossman, Social Backgrounds, supra note 8.

21
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were not entirely accountable for unanimous decisions.22 He added that attitudinal
23
traits did not disappear in unanimous rulings as suggested by Pritchett.
In response, Goldman reiterated his support for Pritchett' s initial assertion.24 In
addition, he provided statistical results from his own work to support this
contention. 2' Goldman found that attitudes determined non-unanimous cases, but
they failed to explain unanimity. As with Pritchett's argument, Goldman assumed
that because attitudes did not explain unanimity, the law must be operating as a key
factor.26
The exchange between these two scholars ended with Grossman asserting that

22

Id. at 334.

Id. at 336.
As used in judicial backgrounds studies it [consensus] has a negative role:
background experiences are seen as relevant and explored only in those decisions
in which courts are divided. Contrasting background experiences are pictured as
the major cause of dissensus, while unanimity or consensus are considered
evidence of the 'non-operation' of background factors. By treating consensus in
this limited way, the potential impact of background factors is severely
circumscribed, if not distorted; no provision is made for cases where background
experiences could lead to consensus ....

23

Id.
4 See Goldman, Backgrounds, Attitudes, supra note 8, at 217. "Consensual case

situations are characterized for the most part (but not exclusively) by the institutional/role
restraints compelling the subordination of personal values, precluding the manufacture of
an ersatz choice when none is 'objectively' present, and thus impelling towards one result."
Id.
2 See Goldman, JudicialAppointments,supra note 1, at 196-97, 207. Goldman's study

of the voting behavior of U.S. courts of appeals judges supported his argument that attitudes
defined non-unanimous rulings, but not unanimous decisions.
In regard to this study, Goldman writes in a separate study that "[t]he scores for the

dissensual labor cases had a statistically significant correlation of .46 with the liberalism
category while the scores for the consensual labor cases had a correlation (not statistically
significant) of .05. This suggests that political attitudes/values were of little import for the
consensually decided labor cases." See Goldman, Backgrounds, Attitudes, supra note 8, at
219-220.
26

Goldman, Backgrounds,Attitudes, supranote 8, at 219.

[m]y model, along the lines of the Pritchett model, suggests that in general a
consensually [unanimously] decided case indicates that 'objectively' the case
situation (either because of clear-cut precedent, or the straight-forward applicability
of the statute, or constitutional provision to the facts of the case) offered little
leeway for the judge ....
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998
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an explanation ofjudicial behavior involved more complexity than Goldman's basic
argument.2 7 It was not as simple as stating that attitudes defined disagreement and
legal factors explained agreement.2 Grossman asserted that Pritchett and Goldman
had ignored critical dimensions of the decisional process.2 9 Grossman concluded
that unanimity could be explained by a host of factors, including legal and
attitudinal influences.30
More recent studies31 have offered limited support for legal factors in the
unanimous decision making process. The argument for legal factors continues to
rest upon the assumption that the law must explain unanimity because attitudes are
not evident in the process.3 2 Such indirect conclusions are not adequate. Future
studies must attempt the difficult task of finding ways to demonstrate how the law
influences the unanimous decision making process. 3
B. Attitudes and Unanimity

As mentioned previously, Grossman made the initial assertion that attitudes
might play a part in the unanimous decision making process3 4 While Grossman

27

Grossman, FurtherThoughts, supra note 8, at 228.

Id. Grossman was very critical of Goldman's statistical results by arguing that
"[Tlests of significance, like paternity tests, can only rule out erroneous interpretations; they
cannot independently establish the validity of a relationship." Id.
29 Id. at 229. Grossman writes that "[Cioncentration on judicial votes and the attitudes
that produce them is a concern with but one dimension of a complex and multi-faceted
process." Id.
30 Id. Grossman remarks that "[I]n the rush to apply newly acquired quantitative
techniques to judicial research, political scientists naturally focused on relationships between
backgrounds variables and decisional output .... Understandably, they tended to avoid the
I.."
Id.
introduction of other variables which might complicate the situation .
28

31 See Werner F. Grunbaum, Analytical and SimulationModels for ExplainingJudicial
Decision Making, FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 307-334 (JOEL B. GROSSMAN &
JOSEPH TANENHAUS eds. 1969). Grunbaum's study of the 1962 U. S. Supreme Court term

supported Pritchett and Goldman's position. See also Thomas R. Hensley & Karen Dean,
Have We Overlooked Something? An Analysis of Supreme CourtDecision Making Using
Both UnanimousandNon-unanimousData (1984) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting

of the American Political Science Association). Hensley and Dean provided some insights
into the factors responsible for unanimity, but they emphasized that they could not confirm
either attitudes or the law as the critical force behind unanimity. Id.
32 See PRTCHETT, supra note 8, at 32-45.
3 For the inherent difficulties in defining and measuring the effect of legal variables,
SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 11, at 33-64.
' Grossman, Social Backgrounds, supra note 8.
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/2
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393

acknowledged the importance of attitudes in this decisional process, he implored
scholars to recognize that attitudes are but one dimension in a complex and multifaceted system. 35 He suggested that other factors besides attitudes might contribute
as well to unanimity. 36 Whatever the case, Grossman placed attitudes for the first
time within the context of the unanimous decision making process. 37 Hence, he
deviated from the traditional assumption that the law explained unanimous
decisions. 8
A basic problem in establishing a relationship between attitudes and unanimity
is demonstrating how liberal and conservative Justices vote together on the Court.
Since Grossman's initial arguments about attitudes and unanimity, several studies
have explored this research question. 9 In one study, Saul Brenner and Theodore
Arrington present an interesting argument concerning attitudes as an explanation
for unanimity.' In their finding that unanimous decisions were often liberal, these
authors concluded that the liberal Justices on the Court were more extreme in their
beliefs, and thus they have a more strongly held ideology than more conservative
justices." While an extremely liberal Justice would never vote for a conservative
outcome, a conservative Justice would sometimes vote with the liberals in a certain

31 Id. at 349.

[Fluture research must look toward an understanding of the relationship of
background to other factors before presuming to 'explain' decisions in background
terms. Attention must be given not only to substantive or doctrinal results, but also
to questions of procedure and form, of power and influence, and of consensus and
dissensus.
Id.
36 Id. For example, Grossman wrote about general institutional pressures toward
consensus such as self-restraint or the preservation of integrity and power of the court. Id.
37 Id.
38

39

See PRrrCHETr, supra note 8, at 5-19.

See generally Hensley & Dean, supra note 31; Donald Feig, Assessing the Casefor

Conflictual Supreme Court DecisionMaking: A FactorAnalysis of Unanimous and Non-

unanimous Supreme CourtDecisions (1984) (paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the
American Political Science Association); Brenner & Arrington, supra note 11; Jeffrey A.
Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Decisional Trends on the Warren and Burger Courts: Results
from the Supreme Court DataBase Project, 73 JUDICATURE 103 (1989); Harold J. Spaeth,
Consensus in the Unanimous Decisions of the U. S. Supreme Court, 72 JUDICATURE 274

(1989).
40 Brenner and Arrington, supra note 11.
41 Id. at 75.
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998
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percentage of cases. 41
Another possible explanation in arguing for a relationship between unanimity
and attitudes is that unanimous decisions result from extremely ideological lower
court decisions.43 This suggests that the Court's case selection process might be
biased at times toward unanimity.44 Finally, some have maintained that unanimous
rulings somehow disguise real conflict and important policy disputes.45 Whatever
the case, it is apparent from a variety of explanations that future research is
necessary in order to determine how attitudes influence the unanimous decision
making process.
C. Strategic Behavior and Unanimity

The movement toward strategic behavior has been supported recently by
numerous law and business school professors. 46 From their perspective, it is an
appropriate framework for the analysis of judicial decision making. Hence, these
scholars have recommended that the strategic approach be considered seriously by
the legal community.

42

Id. Brenner and Arrington surveyed the Vinson, Warren, and Burger Courts in their

study. Id. Interestingly, Hensley and Dean also found a liberal pattern in terms of
unanimous decisions in the Burger Court. See Hensley & Dean, supranote 31. They argued
that no ideological pattern should occur if the legal model was operating in unanimous
decision making; however, they also rejected the attitudinal model because the Burger Court
should have decided unanimously in the conservative direction. Id.
"3 See Thomas R. Hensley & Christopher E. Smith, Membership Change and Voting
Change: An Analysis of the Rehnquist Court's 1986-1991 Terms, 48 POL. RES. Q. 837

(1995). These scholars maintain that the liberalism of unanimous decisions by the Rehnquist
Court might be attributed to extremely conservative lower court judges who are being reined

in by the U. S. Supreme Court. Id. at 852. Hence, the Court might be predisposed toward
unanimous rulings that are either conservative or liberal based upon the types of cases
selected from the lower courts. Id.
4Id.

4 See Spaeth, supra note 39, at 105-06.
4 Such law and business professors have been promoting what they call positive
political theory (PPT), consisting of "non-normative, rational-choice theories of political

institutions," as a way to study judicial decision making. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P.
Frickey, Foreword:PositivePoliticalTheory in the Nineties, 80 GEO. L. J. 457, 461 (1992);
EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 7, at xiii; see also William N. Eskridge, Reneging on
History? Playing the Court/Congress!President Civil Rights Game, 79 CAL. L. REV. 613
(1991); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation

Decisions, 101 YALE L. J. 331 (1991). For a good review, see Daniel B. Rodriguez, The
Positive PoliticalDimensions of Regulatory Reform, 72 WASH. U. L. Q. 1 (1994).
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/2
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Walter F. Murphy provided one of the first insights into the Justices as strategic
decision makers.47 While Murphy argued that Justices were mainly concerned
about their policy goals, he also asserted that they were constrained in their
behavior by the preferences of other actors, their expectations of others, and their
institutional environment.48 For example, a Justice might vote contrary to his
preferences in order to be part of the majority, or he might vote against his
preferences because he anticipates a reaction from the President or Congress.
Murphy utilized landmark cases to demonstrate his point,49 but his thesis failed to
withstand large-scale studies.
Since Murphy's initial work, relatively few studies have employed strategic
behavior as a means toward understanding judicial behavior.5 0 Most recently,
however, Lee Epstein and Jack Knight have attempted to build upon Murphy's
work.5 1 By researching the papers of retired Justices from the Burger Court era,52
Epstein and Knight's comprehensive analysis provides support for Murphy's
intuition. Several case examples53 are utilized in order to demonstrate that the
Justices' actions are based upon their own goals in conjunction with the preferences

47 See WALTER F. MURPHY, ELEMENTS OF JUDICIAL STRATEGY 198-210 (1964).
4' See id. Murphy portrays the Justices as shrewd actors who know or anticipate the

responses of other relevant actors and take them into account in their decision making. Id.
at 201-02.
49 Id.
50 However, judicial scholars have not entirely rejected strategic behavior as a means
toward understanding the behavior of justices. See generally Glendon A. Schubert, The
Study of JudicialDecision-Making as An Aspect of PoliticalBehavior, 52 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 1007 (1958); see also David W. Rohde, Policy Goals and Opinion Coalitions in the
Supreme Court, 16 MIDw. J. POL. SCI. 208 (1972); Robert Lowry Clinton, Game Theory,
Legal History, and the Origins of JudicialReview: A Revisionist Analysis of Marbury v.
Madison, 38 AM. J. POL. Sci. 285 (May 1994); Forrest Maltzman & Paul J. Wahlbeck, May
It Pleasethe Chief? OpinionAssignments in the Rehnquist Court,40 AM. J. POL. Sci. 421
(May 1996); Edward P. Schwartz, Policy, Precedent, and Power: A Positive Theory of
Supreme Court Decision-making, 8 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 219 (1992); Jeffrey A. Segal,
Separation-of-PowersGames in the Positive Theory of Congress and Courts, 91 AMER.
POL. Sci. REV. 28 (March 1997).
"' See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 11.
52 Epstein and Knight use the conference notes, case files, and docket books of four
justices from the Burger Court era: Thurgood Marshall, William J. Brennan, Jr., Lewis F.
Powell, Jr., and William 0. Douglas. EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 11, at xiv-xvi.
5' Among the significant cases utilized by Epstein and Knight are Craig v. Boren, 429
U. S. 190 (1976), Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U. S. 677 (1973), New York v. Quarles, 467
U. S. 649 (1984), and INS v. Chadha, 462 U. S. 919 (1983).
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1998
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and expectations of other actors and institutions. 4 Hence, contrary to the attitudinal
perspective, judicial behavior is not simply a response to ideological values.
Instead, given various constraints and limitations, the Justices behave strategically
in order to achieve their goals.
Does strategic behavior account for the unanimous decision making process of
the U. S. Supreme Court?55 Given the complexities of unanimity and the lack of
evidence provided by other alternatives, it is reasonable to suggest that unanimity
might result from strategic behavior by the Justices. The following section explores
this possibility.
IV. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF UNANIMITY
In an attempt to understand more fully the unanimous decision making process,
this section discusses the characteristics of unanimity. According to an analysis of
the Rehnquist Court from 1986-1990, U. S. Supreme Court cases with one or more
of the following characteristics frequently result in a unanimous decision: 1) cases
in which less time is spent by the Justices between between oral argument and the
decision date; 2) routine or less important cases; 3) cases in which the ideological
direction of the decision is liberal; 4) cases involving federal action; and 5) cases

Id. at xiv-xvi.
While no studies have attempted to link strategic behavior directly with unanimity on
the Court, David W. Rohde noted in his study of minimum winning coalitions that the Court
might seek unanimity in a strategic manner because of presidential or congressional
elections. Rohde, supra note 50, at 208, 210-12. At lower levels of the judiciary, scholars
have found connections between strategic behavior and unanimity. See Hall & Brace, supra
14

15

note 11, at 392-94; see also Melinda Gann Hall, Note, Constituent Influence in State
Supreme Courts: ConceptualNotesanda Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117, 1117 (1987) (finding

that the electoral incentive was a factor in producing unanimous decisions in highly visible
cases before the Louisiana Supreme Court); Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and
Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL. 427,438-40,444 (1992) (finding that

the voting behavior of state supreme court justices in Louisiana, Texas, North Carolina, and
Kentucky supported her previous results); Paul Brace & Melinda Gann Hall, NeoInstitutionalismand Dissent in State Supreme Courts, 52 J. POL. 54, 54 (1990) ; Paul Brace
& Melinda Gann Hall, IntegratedModels ofJudicialDissent,55 J. POL. 914, 918,926, 928

(1993) (finding that institutional rules and practices affected consensus on state supreme
courts).

http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/2
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that do not contain civil liberties issues.56
Most importantly, it is necessary to consider whether these characteristics
correspond with the legal, attitudinal, or strategic perspective of judicial behavior.
The legal and attitudinal approaches have been utilized extensively by judicial
scholars in an attempt to explain unanimity. Contrary to these more traditional
perspectives, strategic behavior has been neglected as a means toward
understanding unanimity.
A. Time
During the first five terms of the Rehnquist Court, one of the most powerful
indicators of unanimity was the amount of time spent by the Justices on a case.
Table 2 reveals that when the Justices spent less than three months between oral
argument and the decision date, the Court ruled unanimously in 55% of its
decisions. Conversely, when the Justices devoted more than three months to a case,
the Court resulted in unanimity only 23% of the time. Hence, it appears that less
time spent by the Justices dramatically increases the likelihood for a unanimous
decision.
TABLE 2: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNANIMITY AND TIME
SPENT BETWEEN ORAL ARGUMENT AND THE DECISION DATE (19861990 terms)

UNANIMOUS
NON-UNANIMOUS
TOTALS

LESS THAN 3
MONTHS
178 (55%)
151 (45%)
329 (100%)

MORE THAN 3
MONTHS
81(23%)
267 (77%)
348 (100%)

TOTAL
259 (38%)
418 (62%
677 (100%)

As members of the U. S. Supreme Court, the Justices are exposed to severe time

See supra note 4 and accompanying text. While these five characteristics appeared
most frequently as part of the unanimous decision making process, other characteristics were
tested in this analysis as well. The following is a list of characteristics which were
considered to be unrelated to unanimity: adherence to precedent, lower court disagreement,
case complexity, the percentage difference in support of amicus briefs, the absolute
difference in support of amicus briefs, participation of the Solicitor General, affirmances,
ideological compostion of the Court, and change in ideological direction of the Court.
56
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constraints.5" From the outset of the Court's term in October, the Justices must deal
58
with thousands of certiorari petitions during the case selection process.
Throughout the remainder of the term, the Justices are engaged in oral arguments
and conference voting. Finally, they must assign and produce numerous majority,
59
concurring, and dissenting opinions for the nearly 100 cases decided each term.
Given their workload, it should not be surprising that the Justices are affected by
time constraints.
It has been recognized that time constraints are a key consideration in the
development of strategic behavior. 6' As stated previously, the proponents of
strategic behavior argue that judicial behavior is tempered by various situational
contexts.6 ' If the Justices spend less time on a case, then it is less likely that they
will develop as many dissenting viewpoints. A Justice would strategically
concentrate upon writing dissenting opinions in cases where time is available to
develop his or her arguments more fully. Legal arguments written hastily might
have less impact upon other members of the judiciary and could even harm the
reputation of a Justice or the Court as a whole.
B. Routine Cases

Some studies have speculated that unanimous decisions occur in important
cases. 62 However, the results from Table 3 reveal that unanimity occurred most

" In describing the workload on the Court, Justice Souter remarked that his first term
on the Court was equivalent to being hit by a tidal wave. Scott P. Johnson & Christopher
E. Smith, David Souter's FirstTerm on the Supreme Court: The Impact of a New Justice,
75 JUDICATURE 238, 243 n.52 (1992).
58 The U. S. Supreme Court receives an estimated 8,000 petitions for certiorari each
term. See generally, DAVID M. O'BRIEN, CONSTrTUTIONAL LAW AND POLITCS: VOLUME 2
CivIL RIGHTS AND CIVIL LIBERTIES 160-181 ( 2 ' ed. 1995).
" In past terms, the Court consistently decided over one hundred cases. However, more
recently, the Court has issued less than one hundred decisions per term. For a
comprehensive account of the Supreme Court's decision making process, see LAWRENCE
BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 1-35 (1981).
60 Herbert. A. Simon, Human Nature In Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with
PoliticalScience, 79 AM. POL. SCl. REv. 293, 301-02 (1985).
61 EPSTEIN&KNIGHT, supra note 11, at 112-167.
62 See S. Sidney Ulmer, Earl Warren and the Brown Decision, 33 J. POL. 689, 690
(1971); see also, Robert H. Dorff & Saul Brenner, Conformity Voting on the United States
Supreme Court, 54 J. POL. 762 (1992); Dennis J. Hutchinson, Unanimity and
Desegregation:Decisionmaking in the Supreme Court, 1948-1958, 68 GEO. L. J. 1 (1979).
There is a sense among scholars that the Court at times rules unanimously in order to
influence Congress, the President, and the lower courts. This is based upon the fact that the
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol31/iss3/2
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often in routine, or less important decisions.63 While 44% of routine cases were
unanimous, the Court achieved unanimity in only 16% of important cases.' It is
necessary to consider whether legal, attitudinal, or strategic behavior is responsible
for this trend.
TABLE 3: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNANIMITY AND ROUTINE
CASES (1986-1990 Terms)
ROUTINE CASES

IMPORTANT
CASES

TOTAL

UNANIMOUS

238 (44%)

21(16%)

259 (38%)

NON-UNANIMOUS
TOTALS

306(56%)
544 (100%)

112(84%)
133 (100%)

418 (62%)
677 (100%)

In accordance with the time and resource constraints placed upon the Justices,
it is reasonable to assume that the Justices strategically focus their energies upon
the most important cases. An important case would increase the possibility that a
Justice would spend his or her resources writing a dissenting opinion. The divisions
in the Court are defined more clearly in important cases where the Justices view

Court is dependent upon other governmental actors for the implementation and compliance
of its decisions.
63 Although most studies equate unanimity with important cases, at least one study has
found that routine cases are part of the unanimous decision making process, albeit at the
state court level. See Edward N. Beiser, The Rhode Island Supreme Court: A WellIntegratedPoliticalSystem, 8 L. & Soc'y REv. 167, 175 (1973).
64 See HENSLEY, SMITH, & BAUGH supra note 4, at 864-865. For the actual definition
of case importance, the authors categorized cases in one of three ways: 1) major importance,
2) moderate importance, and 3) routine, or less importance. Id. The definitions are based
upon two sources which recognized the Court's most important cases each term: 1) New
York Times and 2) United States Supreme Court Reports: Lawyer's Edition. Id. Hensley,
Smith, and Baugh classify a case as being of major importance if both of these sources
recognize the case as an important decision. Id. A case is classified as being of moderate

importance if only one of the sources recognize it as important. Id. Finally, a case is
classified as routine, or less important, if none of the two sources list it as being important.
Id. These sources were deemed by the authors to be reliable, consistent over time, current,
and legitimate to researchers in the field. Id.
For the purposes of this study, the three categories were collapsed into two. Those cases
of major and moderate importance were combined into one category as important cases
while routine, or less important, cases remained the same.
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their opinions as an opportunity to influence a significant aspect of constitutional
law. Hence, a Justice's personal goals are more readily served by writing dissents
in important cases.
Justices experiencing severe time constraints are less likely to squander
resources. A dissenting opinion in a routine case would not gain as much attention
nor would it have as much impact upon policy. Therefore, the likelihood for
unanimity increases in routine cases because of the Court's situational context. The
idea of the Justices collectively reducing their workload by issuing unanimous
decisions in routine decisions is compatible with the strategic approach.
C. IdeologicalDirection of the Decision
65
Because the Rehnquist Court consisted of a majority of conservative Justices
during its first five terms, it is reasonable to expect more unanimous decisions in the
conservative direction.66 However, the following results demonstrate a liberal trend
in terms of unanimity. Table 4 illustrates that 48% of all liberal decisions during
the period of study were unanimous. Surprisingly, the Rehnquist Court ruled
unanimously in only 30% of its conservative decisions. These findings would seem
to run counter-intuitive to the attitudinal theory.6 7

TABLE 4: TIlE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNANIMITY AND THE
IDEOLOGICAL DIRECTION OF THE DECISION (1986-1990 Terms)

UNANIMOUS
NON-UNANIMOUS
TOTALS

LIBERAL
143 (48%)
158 (52%)
301 (100%)

CONSERVATIVE
109 (30%)
256 (70%)
365 (100%)

TOTAL
252 (37%)
414 (63%)
666 (100%)

As mentioned above, studies of earlier Court eras have also found that

' From 1986 to 1990, the following U. S. Supreme Court Justices were classified as
conservative based upon their voting records: Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist, Lewis F.
Powell (retired 1987), Sandra Day O'Connor, Antonin Scalia, Byron White, Anthony
Kennedy (appointed in 1988), and David Souter (appointed in 1990). SPAETH, supra note
4, at 103. Spaeth lists a variable in his data set which indicates the direction of the
individual Justices' votes as either liberal or conservative. Id.
66 The data use standard definitions for liberal and conservative case decisions used by
scholars who apply empirical methods to the study ofjudicial decision making. See SEGAL
& SPAETH, supra note 11, at 300-301.
67

SEGAL & SPAETH,

supra note 11, at 1-20.
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unanimous decisions have tended to be liberal.68 Proponents of the attitudinal
perspective have attempted to reconcile this trend toward liberalism and
unanimity." For example, Brenner and Arrington maintain that the liberal Justices
on previous Courts were simply more extreme in their beliefs, and thus had a more
strongly held ideology than its conservative members.7" These two authors would
argue similarly that the two liberal Justices on the Court from 1986 to 1990,
Thurgood Marshall and William Brennan, are the cause for the relationship between
liberalism and unanimity. Marshall and Brennan's extreme liberalism supposedly
prevented them from voting for a conservative outcome, and thus reduced
unanimous decisions in the conservative direction.
The argument that liberal Justices are more extreme in their beliefs than
conservative Justices is not a satisfying explanation for liberal unanimity. While
Brennan and Marshall displayed strong liberal views on the Court, conservative
Justices such as Antonin Scalia and William Rehnquist were equally forceful in
terms of their ideology.7" It is difficult to imagine these conservative Justices
refraining from authoring a dissenting opinion against a liberal majority simply
because their ideological beliefs were not strong enough. In addition, the fact that
more conservatives than liberals served on the Rehnquist Court provided more
opportunity for dissenting opinions when the Court ruled in a liberal direction.
Because the Justices are seemingly not operating according to attitudinal
behavior, it is worthwhile to consider whether the legal or strategic perspectives
might offer an explanation for liberalism in the unanimous decision making process.
In terms of legal behavior, it has been suggested that the Rehnquist Court is simply
upholding the liberal precedent from previous Court eras.72 While this is plausible,
judicial scholars have been unsuccessful in their attempts to test and measure the
effect of precedent on judicial behavior.73 Therefore, it remains uncertain whether
legal behavior influences unanimity in this manner.
Strategic behavior offers another possibility concerning the relationship between

68
69
70

See Brenner & Arrington, supra note 11, at 75.
Id.
Id.

71 For example, Rehnquist and Scalia voted together with Justices Clarence Thomas and
Sandra Day O'Connor in 91 percent of all formally decided cases during the 1993 term.
Joyce Ann Baugh et al., Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: A PreliminaryAssessment, 26 U.

TOL. L. REv. 1, 33 (1994). Such a high percentage indicates their commitment to the
conservative block on the Court.
72 Hensley & Dean, supra note 31.
" SEGAL& SPAETHi, supranote 11, at 11-30.
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liberalism and unanimity. It is conceivable that the Court is serving goals that
produce liberal rulings. For example, the Justices might be increasing the power of
the Court or the judiciary as a whole with specific decisions.74 Any increase in the
power of the judicial branch in relation to the executive or legislative branches is
categorized as a liberal decision. A collective strategy of this nature might explain
the trend in liberal unanimity during the past fifty years."
While these ideas relating to legal and strategic behavior are interesting, they
have not been tested in research studies. In any event, the continuing inadequacy
of the attitudinal perspective increases the likelihood that liberal unanimity might
result from innovations derived from legal or strategic behavior.
D. FederalAction Cases
Table 5 demonstrates that unanimity occurs frequently in cases dealing with
federal action. Nearly one-half of all federal action cases" from 1986 through 1990
were unanimous. Interestingly, the Court ruled unanimously in only 30% of cases
that did not involve congressional or presidential action. These results also are
compatible with strategic behavior.7 8
TABLE 5: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNANIMITY AND FEDERAL
ACTION CASES (1986-1990 terms)

UNANIMOUS
NON-UNANIMOUS
TOTALS

FEDERAL
ACTION
163 (47%)
193 (53%)
356 (100%)

NO FEDERAL
ACTION
96 (30%)
225 (70%)
321 (100%)

TOTAL
259 (38%)
418 (62%)
677 (100%)

As one of the three branches of government, the U.S. Supreme Court is subject

See SPAETH, supra note 4, at 82. Spaeth defines pro-exercise of judicial power
decisions as liberal. Id.
71

75 id.
76

See Hensley & Dean, supra note 31; see also Brenner & Arrington, supra note 11, at

75.

See SPAETH, supranote 4. Federal action cases are equivalent to Spaeth's version of
cases with federal statutory interpretation which he defines as cases involving the
interpretation of a federal statute, treaty, court rule, or executive order. Id.
78 See EPsTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 11, at 1-21.
77
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to various checks and balances inherent in the separation of powers doctrine. 9 For
instance, the legislative branch can threaten the Court's jurisdiction ° and size, 1 or
the executive branch simply can refuse to implement a judicial decision. 2 Hence,
the Court must render decisions that are respected by Congress and the President.
Because the Justices consider the preferences and expected actions of other
government actors, they should behave strategically in cases dealing with Congress
or the President. 3 Therefore, the Court should desire unanimity because it is
necessary to rule assertively in cases involving congressional or presidential
action. 4 Otherwise, judicial decisions might be questioned easily by the other
branches if the Court appears uncertain or ambiguous in its ruling. Any division

" The Founding Fathers were not content simply with separating power among the three
branches of government. Each branch was created to check the other. THE ENDURING
FEDERALIST, 1-15 (Charles Beard, ed. 1948).
80 In 1868, the elected branches eliminated the Court's appellate jurisdiction in specific
cases to prevent the Supreme Court from ruling on a federal law. See Ex parte McCardle,
74 U.S. 506, 509-10 (1868).
81 The elected branches have changed the size of the Court in order to add Justices with
different views. This has occurred three times during the Jackson, Lincoln, and Grant

administrations.
82

See Lawrence Baum, Implementation of Judicial Decisions: An Organizational

Analysis, 4 AM. POL. Q. 86, 86-87 (1976); see also CHARLES A. JOHNSON &

BRADLEY

C.

1-40 (1984).
83 Epstein and Knight describe various institutional contexts that influence the Justices
on the Court. They write:
[J]ustices need to consider two sets of institutions that establish their relationship
with relevant external actors. First, because they serve in one of three branches of
government, their decisions are subject to the checks and balances inherent in the
separation of powers system instantiated in the Constitution.To create efficacious
law -- that is, policy that the other branches will respect and with which they will
comply--justices must take into account the preferences and expected actions of
these other government actors. Second, because the justices operate within the
greater social and political context of the society as a whole, they need to be
attentive to the informal norms that reflect dominant societal beliefs about the rule
of law in general and the role of the Supreme Court in particular.
Epstein & Knight, supra note, 11 at 138.
8 Alexander Bickel describes the tension between the U. S. Supreme Court and the
elected branches as the "Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty." See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE
CANON, JUDICIAL POLICIES: IMPLEMENTATION AND IMPACT

LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH THE SUPREME COURT AT THE

SAR

OF POLITICS

16 (1962).

Justice Lewis F. Powell wrote: "We should be ever mindful of the contradictions that would
arise if a democracy were to permit general oversight of the elected branches of government
by a nonrepresentative, and in large measure insulated, judicial branch." U. S. v.
Richardson, 418 U. S.166, 188 (1974).
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might weaken the authority and legitimacy of the Court's ruling.85 By issuing
unanimous decisions in cases involving federal action, the Court is able to protect
its own power stakes.
E. Issue Areas
Civil liberties cases include decisions involving criminal procedure, civil rights,
the First Amendment, due process, and privacy.86 Non-civil liberties cases include
rulings dealing with attorneys, unions, economic activity, judicial power,
federalism, federal taxation, and miscellaneous issues.87 When the issue areas are
divided between these two groups, a striking pattern emerges in terms of unanimous
decision making. Table 6 demonstrates a strong relationship between unanimity
and cases that do not contain civil liberties issues. While 51% of non-civil liberties
cases were unanimous, only 27% of civil liberties cases unified the Justices. A
plethora of U. S. Supreme Court studies has established conclusively that attitudes
are a critical determinant of civil liberties cases.88 Civil liberties cases readily
produce policy choices for the Justices, and therefore these decisions readily divide
liberals and conservatives on the Court. 89 Having established that attitudes are a
critical factor in the outcome of civil liberties cases, it is necessary to explain what
factors are responsible for the results of non-civil liberties cases.
While non-civil liberties cases offer policy choices, they are not as broad or
controversial because they are less salient than civil liberties cases. Therefore, the
level of conflict should be reduced among the Justices in non-civil liberties
decisions. The Justices might view these cases as less controversial, and as a result,
devote less of their resources toward writing dissenting opinions. In addition, the
Justices strategically might select these less controversial cases in order to achieve

While judicial power is most difficult to justify because representative government
is defined entirely in terms of public accountability, some studies suggest that the Justices'
decisions do reflect public opinion. See THOMAS R. MARSHALL, PUBLIC OPINION AND THE
SUPREME COURT 161 (1989).
86 See SPAETH, supra note 4.
85

87 id.

See PRrrCHETr,supra note 8, at 25-31.
James L. Gibson writes: "The most commonly accepted explanation of the exercise
of discretion in decision making is that judges rely on their own ideological positions in
making their decisions. Judges' decisions are a function of what they prefer to do;..."
James L. Gibson, Decision Making in Appellate Courts, in THE AMERICAN COURTS: A
CRiTCAL ASSESSMENT (John B. Gates and Charles A. Johnson eds., 1991).
88
89
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harmony on the Court.9" Without such areas of common ground, the Justices would
be unable to devote their energies toward more controversial cases of constitutional
law regarded by many scholars as civil liberties.
TABLE 6: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN UNANIMITY AND
ISSUE AREAS (1986-1990 Terms)
CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNANIMOUS
NON-UNANIMOUS
TOTALS

V.

98 (27%)
266 (73%)
364 (100%)

STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR ON THE COURT:

NON-CIVIL
LIBERTIES
161 (51%)
152 (49%)
313 (100%)

A NEW

TOTAL
259 (38%)
418 (62%)
677 (100%)

PERSPECTIVE FOR

UNDERSTANDING UNANIMITY

In previous studies, the attitudinal and legal perspectives have struggled in its
attempts to explain unanimity. 9' This analysis has confirmed the difficulty of these
two perspectives to explain the characteristics of unanimous decision making. A
strong trend of liberalism in unanimous decisions from a highly conservative Court
is most problematic for the proponents of attitudinal behavior. 2 Likewise, scholars
favoring the legal approach continue to rely upon the weak assumption that the law
defines unanimity on the basis that attitudes have disappeared from the decision
making process. 93 Proponents of the legal perspective face the difficult task of
developing improved methods and techniques for measuring the influence of the
law upon unanimity. 94
Contrary to these traditional approaches, the strategic perspective appears to
offer an innovative way to explain unanimity. 9 Strategic behavior explains four of
the five characteristics of unanimity (the amount of time spent by the Justices,

9 Lawrence Baum, What Judges Want: Judges' Goals and JudicialBehavior,47 POL.

REs. Q. 749, 752 (1994). Baum lists several types of goals including achieving harmony,
raising judicial salaries, and holding power within the court. Id.
9' See generally,PRITCHETr,supra note 8, at xi-xii; see also Brenner & Arrington, supra

note 11, at 75.
92 See Brenner & Arrington, supra note 11, at 84; Hensley & Dean, supra note 31.
9' See PRrrCHETr, supranote 8, at 50-75; Hensley & Dean, supra note 31.
9' See SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 11, at 33-67.

9 Rohde, supra note 50, at 224; Hall and Brace, supra note 11, at 391-94.
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routine cases, federal action rulings, and non-civil liberties decisions) in a
of policy-minded Justices
convincing manner. Each relates impressively to the idea
96
operating in an environment with various constraints.
The remaining characteristic--the ideological direction of the decision--is not as
easily accounted by using strategic behavior. However, the frequency of unanimous
rulings in liberal decisions seems suited towards either strategic or legal behavior.
As noted earlier, this is based upon the fact that the argument for attitudinal
behavior runs counter-intuitive to this finding.97 If attitudes were a critical
determinant of unanimity, the Rehnquist Court should have issued a much higher
percentage of unanimous decisions in the conservative direction.98
Having related these characteristics to strategic behavior, it is worthwhile to
speculate about their relationship to each other. As noted above, it appears that time
constraints force the Justices to expend their resources on the most significant and
controversial cases. The policy disputes among the Justices are developed most
fully in the significant and controversial areas of constitutional law. Therefore,
Justices author a higher quantity and quality of dissenting opinions in the most
notable areas of the law. Because members of the Court strategically focus on
important or controversial areas at the expense of less important or controversial
ones, routine cases and non-civil liberties issues might be neglected by the Court.
Hence, the Justices are less likely to develop dissenting viewpoints in these less
meaningful decisions. 99
Beyond the time restrictions, the Court is also limited by its institutional

See EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 11, at 138-145.
9 SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 11, at 1-24.
98 The conservatism of the Rehnquist Court can be characterized by the following
statistics: In civil rights and liberties cases, the Warren Court (1953-69) handed down liberal
decisions in 71% of cases. Christopher E. Smith & Thomas R. Hensley, Assessing the
ConservatismoftheRehnquist Court, 77 JUDICATURE 83, 85 (Sept.-Oct. 1993). By contrast,
after a number of Republican appointeesjoined the Court, the Burger Court (1969-1986) and
Rehnquist Court (1986-present) issued liberal decisions in only 44% and 43% of civil
liberties cases, respectively. See id.
99 See Steven A. Peterson, Dissent in American Courts, 43 J. POL.412, 423-24 (1981).
Peterson hypothesized that meaningful issues on which there was no societal consensus
would increase dissent rates. Id. Justice Robert Jackson wrote that "Conflicts which have
divided the Justices always mirror a conflict which pervades society." ROBERT H. JACKSON,
96

THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER

POLxrICs 312 (1941)
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context."° It is realistic to assume that the Justices are cognizant of the actions and
preferences of Congress and the President."1 Therefore, it must operate strategically
in regard to federal action cases. The Court can protect its authority and legitimacy
by speaking assertively with one voice in cases concerning the more powerful
branches of government.'0 2
In short, unanimous decision making can be defined by the situational and
institutional contexts of the Court. 3 Based on the characteristics of unanimity, it
appears that time considerations and institutional pressures create frequent
opportunities for the Justices to unite in their decision making.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

This study of the Rehnquist Court asserts that unanimity on the Court is a
product of strategic behavior."' Unanimity serves the goal-related behavior of the
Justices who are forced to deal with time and resource constraints as well as their
institutional environment.'
The consequence of this behavior is that unanimity
occurs frequently in cases with one or more of the following characteristics: 1) less
time spent by the Justices between oral argument and the decision date; 2) routine
or less important decisions; 3) liberal rulings; 4) federal action decisions; and 5)
issue areas that do not contain civil liberties.
Each of these characteristics has been encompassed within the strategic
framework, with the except liberal outcomes. However, it has been argued that

liberal unanimity is probably a result of either the strategic or legal approach
because liberalism on the Rehnquist Court is not compatible with the attitudinal
perspective.

"00 EPsTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 11, at 112-15. Epstein and Knight describe the
Court's institutional context according to internal and external factors. Id. For example,
internal factors consist of the Rule of Four and the assignment of opinions, while external
factors involve the executive and legislative branches as well as the public. Id.

101

Id.

o See Peterson, supra note 99, at 424. Peterson hypothesized that organizational
loyalty, coupled with a sense that dissent hurts the court, leads to individual judges being
less dissent-prone. Id. For empirical confirmation regarding this hypothesis, see John P.
Frank, Book Review, The UnpublishedOpinionsof Mr.JusticeBrandeis, 10J.LEGALEDUC.
401 (1958). Brandeis supposedly withheld many dissenting opinions because he felt that
random dissents would weaken the Court. Id. at 404.
103

EPSTEIN & KNIGHT, supra note 11, at 112-120.

104

Id.

15 Id.
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10 6
While past studies focused mainly upon the attitudinal and legal approaches,
this analysis has relied almost exclusively upon strategic behavior in order to
understand more fully the unanimous decision making process. Future research
should continue to focus upon characteristics related to the strategic perspective.
It should be emphasized that, other characteristics derived from traditional or other
innovative approaches should not be overlooked because of the complexities
inherent in the study of unanimity.

" See generally PRrrCHETT, supranote 8, at 1-20; Brenner & Arrington, supranote 11,
at 75.
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